A vault no wallet key can open.
Wallets are protected by a kind of maths a large quantum computer could undo. This vault is protected by hashing alone, which is believed to survive one. Every spend goes through Phil's compiled code.
No such computer exists today. This is a working demonstration on a test network, of the known way to be ready for one.
The fear, in plain words
Every transaction you sign shows your public key. Today nobody can work your private key out from it.
A large enough quantum computer could. Whoever had one could sign as you, and nothing on chain would look wrong.
Hashing. Running a hash backwards stays hard, so signatures built only from hashes stay safe. They have one strict rule, below.
Is a wallet exposed?
Paste any Solana address to see what a quantum computer would be looking at. Nothing is asked of your wallet; the address is only sent to a public Solana node to read its balances.
The one rule: a key signs once
A hash-based key is 26 chains of hashes. A signature reveals a point part-way along each chain. Anyone can hash forward from a revealed point, so every extra signature from the same key gives a forger more of every chain. Try it here: this key is a throwaway and guards nothing.
Where Phil comes in
“Use exactly once” is the rule Phil is built around. Written in Phil, a one-time key is a thing that signing uses up, so a second signature with it is refused before the program runs.
The vault
The vault holds one key's fingerprint. A spend is signed with that key and names the next key, and the vault moves to it in the same step. The used key is never accepted again, so the rule is kept on chain too.
Make a new vault
Coins such as Philcoin can be added once the vault exists.
This phrase is the vault. Whoever has it can spend; without it the funds can never be moved, by anyone. It was made in this browser and is not sent anywhere.
This is the guard phrase. It cannot spend. It can cancel a waiting withdrawal and give the vault a new phrase, which makes it the stronger of the two. Keep it on paper, apart from the first. This page does not keep it.
Add funds
Withdraw
Phrase stolen? Cancel and re-key
The guard phrase drops any waiting withdrawal and gives the vault a key from a brand-new phrase, so the stolen one is worth nothing. The guard key is one-time too and moves to its next key.
The vault's new phrase. Save it now: once this is sent, the old phrase no longer works.
How a spend is checked
Your browser signs one message with the current key: this vault, this recipient, this coin, this amount, the next key.
your browserAnyone can carry it to Solana. Phil's server checks the upload arrived whole: the handshake, the policy, the bytes against their declared hash.
Phil's serverThe program hashes each of the 26 chains forward to its end and compares the result with the fingerprint it holds.
our codeThe vault takes the next key's fingerprint and the amount is paid, or, in a vault with a waiting time, recorded to be paid once the time has passed. The old key is finished.
our codeBefore you rely on it
- Do not put real money behind this. It is on devnet and nobody independent has reviewed it. Cryptography is the last place to skip a review.
- Locked means it cannot be fixed either. New vaults use a copy of the program whose upgrade key was given up, so nobody, us included, can change it. If a bug is found in it, the only remedy is to move to a new copy. The first copy we deployed can still be replaced by our deploy key.
- Lose the phrase, lose the funds. There is no recovery and nobody to ask. This page keeps a copy of the vault's phrase in this browser's storage, which is convenient and is also a risk on a shared or infected computer. Print the backup sheet.
- The guard phrase is the stronger one. It can replace the vault's key, so whoever holds it can take the vault over after one waiting time. It is never stored by this page. If both phrases are stolen together, the waiting time does not help.
- A waiting time only helps if you look. A withdrawal you did not sign has to be noticed and cancelled before its time is up.
- It protects what is in the vault, and nothing else. Your ordinary wallet, and anything paid out to it, is as exposed as before.
- What Phil's code checks, and what it does not. Phil's server checks each upload's handshake, its policy, and that the bytes match the hash they declare. The signature check, the payment and the key rotation are our C code, which is not Phil and is not verified.
- The signature is trimmed to fit a Solana transaction. Each hash is kept to 192 bits. Finding a preimage with a quantum computer is estimated at about 296 hash steps: far out of reach, but less margin than the 256-bit versions used where size is no object.
- The fee payer still uses an ordinary wallet signature. That is fine: the one-time signature fixes the recipient, the amount and the next key, so a forged fee signature can pay for a spend but cannot change it.
- A signed spend can only ever be that spend. If a transaction fails after you sign, this page sends the same one again. It will not sign something different with the same key.
- Solana itself is not quantum-safe. Validators use the same kind of signature as wallets. This vault removes one weak point, the key that guards your funds, and not the others.
- Some coins can be moved by their issuer. A coin whose issuer kept the power to freeze accounts or move balances keeps that power over a vault too. Coins with transfer hooks cannot be withdrawn by this version.
- Nobody knows when, or whether, a quantum computer able to break wallet keys will exist.
Where this comes from
Hash-based one-time signatures go back to Lamport and Winternitz in the 1970s. Putting one behind a Solana vault that rotates its key on every spend was shown by Dean Little's Solana Winternitz Vault in January 2025, and this follows that design. What is ours: every spend is an upload through the server Phil's compiler emits, and the use-once rule is shown in Phil.
This is a community project and is not affiliated with Phil or Solana.