Every bit
Take one honest upload to a program compiled from Phil, the one that runs on Solana's devnet. Then attack it the plainest way there is: send it again with one bit flipped, for every bit it has, and again cut short, at every length.
The upload, one square per attack
Each square is one bit of the upload, and one attack: the upload with just that bit flipped. Its colour is the reason the program gave for refusing it. Tap any square.
And the same upload cut short. Each bar is one attack carrying only the first bytes, from none of them up to all but one.
Every reason it gave
The program does not just fail. It says which rule the upload broke, as a number that is the same on every chain.
What this shows, and what it does not
- It is complete for what it tries. Every one-bit change and every shortening of this one upload is here. None was skipped and none was picked for looking good.
- It is not every possible attack. Changing two bits at once, or building a hostile upload from nothing, is a far larger space. The mutation analysis and the fuzzer go at the same code from other sides.
- What ran is Phil's own compiled code for its upload protocol, unchanged, with a small runtime of ours underneath it to meet Solana. The refusals come from Phil's code. Ours has not been audited.
- The digest is what catches most of them. An upload declares the SHA-256 of its bytes before sending them, so a flipped bit in either no longer matches. The rest are caught earlier: by the framing, the version check, the server's policy, or the count of bytes.
- Devnet is Solana's public test network. It is reset from time to time; when it is, the links here go stale until the next run.
- This page is independent of the Phil project. The code that made it is in everybit/.